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Abstract
This paper is a highly selective review of our knowledge about the scope
for sterilized intervention in foreign exchange markets under alternative
exchange-rate regimes. Section I demonstrates the potential importance of
simultaneous-equations bias in single-equation econometric studies of the
capital-account offset to monetary policy under fixed exchange rates. The
empirical record suggests that, in the case of West Germany, sterilization
was a feasible short-run monetary strategy in the 1960s. Section II notes
that there is considerable recent evidence of imperfect asset substitutability
under the managed float. While limited substitution between bonds of dif-
ferent currency denomination is a precondition for the efficacy of sterilized
foreign-exchange intervention, it is no guarantee of efficacy. Whether
limited substitutability can in fact be exploited in a predictable manner





(January 1 -June1, 1982)Under managed floating, as under the Bretton Woods system, central
banks have intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market. As before,
they have often attempted to divorce their intervention activities fromtheir
money supplies through offsetting operations in domesticfinancial markets.
An official purchase of foreign exchange can be sterilized through a cor-
responding open-market sale of domestic securities. The transaction,which
is equivalent to an official forward sale of domestic currency, leaves rela-
tive money supplies unchanged but alters the relative supplies of foreign-
and domestic-currency bonds available to the public.
Regardless of the exchange-rate regime, sterilized intervention may be
viewed as an attempt to attain independent exchange-rate and money-stock tar-
gets in the short run. For this to be possible, bonds denominatedin different
currencies must be imperfect substitutes in private portfolios. If feasible,
sterilization may or may not be useful in attaining the long-run objectives
of the Central Bank.
This paper is a highly selective review of our knowledge about the
scope for sterilization. Section I demonstrates the potential importance
of simultaneous-equations bias in single-equation econometric studies of
the capital-account offset to monetary policy under fixed exchange
rates. The empirical record suggests that, at least in the case of West
Germany, sterilization was a feasible short-run strategy in the 1960s.
Section II notes that there is considerable recent evidence of imperfect
asset substitutability under the managed float. Whether this limited
substitutability can be exploited in a predictable manner by central banks
is a distinct, and unanswered, question.2
I. The Scope for Sterilization under FixedExchangeRates
When the exchange rate is fixed and capital is internationally mobile,
the central problem of monetary management is the endogeneity of the home money
supply. Domestic credit expansion aimed at affecting internal markets causes
an incipient weakening of the exchange rate. To maintain the official parity,
the Central Bank must intervene in the foreign exchange market by buying high-
powered money with foreign reserves. In this manner, attempts to alter the
domestic source component of the monetary base are impeded, even in the short
run, by offsetting movements in its domestic source component. If the offset
to domestic credit expansion is complete, the monetary base is determined
independently of the Central Bank's policies by the saving and portfolio deci-
sions of the public. In particular, attempts to sterilize reserve flows through
offsetting domestic credit measures cannot succeed, even temporarily.
The Central Bank can affect the monetary base through open-market operations
only when domestic- and foreign-currency bonds are imperfect substitutes in in—
vestors' portfolios; under perfect substitutability, the capital-account offset
to domestic credit measures is immediate and complete, provided there are no lags
in portfolio adjustment (see Robert Mundell). However, limited substitutability
is in itself no guarantee of monetary autonomy. If a rational public anticipates
the future tax liabilities implied by the government's debt and the Central Bank's for-
eign reserve holdings, and so "internalizes" the public-sector budget constraint,
official operations in interest-bearing assets will not alter outside asset sup-
plies. Accordingly, such operations will have no influence on the domestic inter-
est rate or money supply even when various risks drive a wedge between home and
foreign interest rates (see the author (1982) and Alan Stockman)
The offset coefficient--the fraction of any domestic credit expansion
reversed by Central Bank foreign reserve losses in the same quarter--provides3
a useful summary measure of the scope for a domestically-oriented monetary
policy.In reality, this offset depends on the current-account as well as the
capital-account response to domestic credit creation. Empirical studies of the
offset coefficient have typically assumed that the capital-account response is
dominant in the short run, and so regard the current account and income as pre-
determined. The offset coefficient is therefore interpreted as a measure of
capital-account sensitivity to domestic credit expansion, with a coefficient
of unity indicating a complete offset.
Within the foregoing framework, there are essentially two approaches to
empirical estimation of the offset coefficient. The first, a reduced-form ap-
proach, derives from the bond- and money-market equilibrium conditions and the
Central Bank's balance sheet an approximate linear equation relating thequarter-
ly capital-account surplus (CAP)to the change in domestic credit over the quarter
(LDC) ,thechange in the foreign bond rate the change in nominal income
(iY),the current account balance (CURR),a vector X of additional, exogenous de-
terminants of the capital account, and a mean-zero stochastic disturbance
(1) CAPt=
+ ci1DC +
+ a3zY1+ a4CURR-I- X +Ut
As observed by Victor Argy and Pentti k'ouri and by Kourj and MichaelPorter, (1)
can be used to estimate the offset coefficient-cx1. Because the domestic interest
rate has been eliminated from the reduced form (1), the estimationproblem caused
by the potential endogeneity of that variable is avoided.
The second, structural approach to estimation looks directly at the asset-
demand equations underlying (1), Using structuralparameter estimates to compute
the implied offset to credit policy. Examples of this secondapproach are the4
studies of West Germany by Richard Herring and Richard Marston and by the
author (1980a),and the study of Mexico in the 1970s by Robert Cumby and the
author (198la). The structural approach suffers from several disadvantages
relative to the reduced-form approach. For example, it may be less robust
with respect to certain specification errors in structural equations. Also,
unlike the reduced-form approach, it cannot be implemented when there is unlimited
substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds. However, the structural ap-
proach avoids an important econometric problem which may bias reduced-form estimates.
That problem is the endogeneity of the domestic credit variable tDC in
(1) when the Central Bank follows a sterilization policy. If domestic credit
is systematically varied in response to the balance of payments, the regressor
will be correlated with the disturbance u to the capital-flow equation (1)
Accordingly, ordinary least squares (OLSQ) estimates of the parameters in
(1.) will be inconsistent. In recognition of this problem, Argy and
Kouri used instrumental variables to estimate (1) by two-stage least squares
(2SLS). However, most single-equation studies, including Kouri and
Porter, report OLSQ estimates of the offset coefficient, and convey the impres-
sion that the simultaneous-equations bias imparted to those estimates by Central
Bank sterilization activities is likely to be unimportant in practice.
A detailed examination of the West German case illustrates the po-
tential importance of the sterilization bias. The Kouri-Porter reduced-form
estimate of the offset coefficient for West Germany (1960:1 -l970:IV)is .77, a
figure that indicates a substantial capital-account response to domestic credit
movements. Table I reports estimates of the Kouri-Porter equation based on the
revised Bundesbank data series used in Manfred Neumann's study of offsetting



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Structural estimates of the offset are considerably lower. Simulation of
Herring and Marstons dynamic multi-equation model yields an offset similar to that
estimated by Noun and Porter only after asset markets have been allowed to adjust
over a period of sixteen quarters. The one-quarter offset is much smaller.
Similarly, the structural model of Obstfeld (1980 a) yields a short-run offset
between .10 and .15.
A substantial portion of the discrepancy between the structural and
reduced-form estimates is explained by the inclusion of periods of speculative
turbulence in the reduced-form data samp1e.- When the Koüri-Porter equation is
estimated instead over the tranquil sub-period 1961:111 to 1967:IV, the OLSQ
estimate of the offset coefficient drops to .56. The latter estimate is still
large compared to those produced by the structural studies.
The remaining discrepancy can be attributed to the sterilization bias.
Herring and Marston report a Bundesbank domestic-credi.t policy reaction func-
tion in which domestic credit responds not only to the balance of payments, but also
to lagged inflation and to the lagged percentage change in manufacturing orders. If
u in (1) is serially uncorrelated, the latter two variables are correlated with
LDC but not with u, and may be used as instrumental variables for ADCt
calculating a 2SLS estimate of the offset coefficient../ This estimate,
reported in Table I, is insignificantly different from zero, and thus is very
different from the OLSQ estimate over the same sample period. A formal test,
due to Jerry Hausman, shows that the hypothesis that there is no sterilization bias
can be definitively rejected. To implement the Hausman test, add to (1) the
variable ADCt, which is the predicted value from an OLSQ regression of on
the instrumental variables, including the other regressors in (1). The hypo-
thesis of no sterilization bias is equivalent to the hypothesis that the co-
efficient of LDC is zero. The result of QLSQ estimation (with standard errors
in parentheses) is:6
(2) CAPt =.183-.618ADC -.433iR -.006Y -.840CURR




The hypothesis that the coefficient of in (2) is zero is easily rejected.
The message of this exercise is that reduced-form OLSQ offset estimates
should be interpreted with caution. In the case of West Germany, at least, struc-
tural offset estimates appear more reliable; and they suggest that the short-run
offset to Bundesbank domestic credit policy was rather moderate in the l960s.
These tentative conclusions relate exclusively to the feasibility of sterilization
as a short-run or temporary policy. Did the Bundesbank's short-run monetary
autonomy afford West Germany any long-run independence from monetary developments
abroad? The speculative turbulence of the years 1968-1973 is evidence that it
4/ didnot.
II. The Scope for Sterilization under Managed Floating
When the exchange rate floats, the nominal money supply becomes a policy-
determined variable which may be set by the Central Bank at any desired level.
The freedom from offsetting reserve losses is largely illusory, however, for
central banks are usually unwilling to live with the exchange-rate consequences
of their monetary decisions. As Charles Kindleberger prophetically observed in
1969, "Along with one more variable there is one more target--the exchange rate."
If foreign- and domestic-currency bonds are perfect substitutes, Central
Bank operations involving nonmonetary assets will have no effect on equilibrium
exchange rates and interest rates, except, perhaps, in the very short run. As in
the case of a rigidly fixed exchange rate, the Central Bank can attain independent
exchange-rate and money-stock targets only if it can alter the expected nominal7
yield differential between foreign and domestic bonds. On a portfolio-balance
view of exchange-rate determination, in which bonds of different currency denom-
ination are imperfect substitutes, debt management may be an independent instru-
ment of exchange-rate policy.(See, for example, William Branson, Lance Girton
and Dale Henderson, Peter Kenen, Kouri, and Obstfeld (l980c).)
A number of recent econometric studies conclude that bonds differing in
their currency of denomination are not viewed as perfect substitutes by in-
vestors even when the bonds are identical in all other respects.(See Cumby
and the author (198lb), Craig Hakkio, and Lars Hansen and Robert Hodrick, among
others.)Cumby and the author investigate the stochastic properties of weekly






where S is the U.S. dollar price of currency j at time t, R is the one-week
Eurodollar interest rate, and R is the one-week interest rate paid on Euro-
currency deposits denominated in currency j.If dollar bonds and currency-j
bonds are perfect substitutes, then, in an efficient asset market, the ex post
nominal return differential must be uncorrelated with information available
to investors at time t. In fact, lagged values ,£l,...of the expost excess
return do help forecast for all currencies examined. This evidence indicates
that is the sum of a white-noise forecast error anda time-varying risk
risk premium. The latter separates the expected nominal yield on dollar
bonds from that on bonds denominated incurrency j.
Of course, the foregoing evidence does not imply that Central Bank fin-
ancial operations can influence the risk premium in a predictable manner. Even
if government securities are outside assets, stochastic models of international
asset pricing leave one doubtful that a small country's sterilized intervention
operations can have a significant effect on its exchange rate. And a large8
country would have to intervene massively to have much impact..1'
There is little econometric evidence concerning the effects of sterilized
intervention. Regressions of exchange rates on supplies of government-issued
interest-bearing debt cannot shed much light on the issue, for an increase
in government borrowing may affect the exchange rate by signalling additional
future money creation. A more promising approach, adopted by Jeffrey Frankel,
is to regress the ex post excess return (3) on financial variables in an attempt
toidentify the determinants of the risk premium. In tests on U.S.-German
data, Frankel could find no financial variables that help in explaining the
ex post nominal return differential. This finding is not evidence against the
existence of a risk premium; but it does suggest that the static models of in-
ternational asset pricing underlying the portfolio-balance view may be inade-
quate. The evidence does not support the proposition that sterilized intervention
has been a potent policy tool in recent years.9
Footnotes
*Associate Professor, Columbia University.I thank R. Dornbusch, D. Henderson,
P. Isard, B. Loopesko, K. Rogoff, and J. Wilson for helpful suggestions. All
errors and opinions are my own. Financial support from the National Science
Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
In these equations, the domestic credit variable is defined as the increase
in the net domestic assets of the Bundesbank plus the increase in required re-
serve holdings by private banks. It is equal to the variable NDA +Lin Neumann.
This measure captures the importance of reserve requirement changes as an
instrument of monetary management in Germany.
Kouri and Porter argue that the inclusion of additional dummy variables
in periods of heavy speculation reduces the bias in OLSQ estimates. In fact,
the effect of dummy variables on the estimated offset is quite small for the
data set used here.
The inflation rate is the rate of increase in the German WPI. Data are
taken from the 1973 Supplement to the IMF's International Financial Statistics.
Data on manufacturing orders (in the form of an index) come from the OECD's
Historical Statistics.
For a theoretical discussion of sterilization as a long-run policy, see
Obstfeld (1980b).
The argument here assumes that the Central BanUs decision to undertake
sterilized intervention does not convey to the market new information regard-
ing future monetary growth. Michael Mussa discusses that possibility.10
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